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I. INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the 1930s' constitutional crisis,' the Supreme
Court adopted an extremely deferential interpretation of the Commerce
Clause:2 the Court sustained commercial legislation provided that Con* Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
1. For a description of the crisis, see William Leuchtenberg, The Origins of Franklin
D. Roosevelt's Court-PackingPlan, 1966 SuP. CT. REv. 347 (1966).
2. Prior to the 1930s, the scope of review varied; courts generally upheld federal
statutes regulating goods or commerce that travelled across state lines. For example, the
Mann Act made it a federal crime to knowingly transport women across state lines for the
purpose of prostitution or to compel the woman to engage in other "immoral practice[s]." 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421 to 2424 (1994). The Act read:
[I]t shall be illegal to transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in
obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate [commerce], or [in] the
District of Columbia, any woman [for] the purpose of prostitution [or] with the
intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman [to] give herself up to
debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice ....
18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1994).
During this period, the Court placed definite limits on the scope of Congress power.
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court drew a distinction between
activities that had a "direct' and those that had only an "indirecf' effect on interstate commerce. Congress could regulate the former, but not the latter:
That the production of every commodity intended for interstate sale and transportation has some effect upon interstate commerce may be, if it has not already
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gress had a rational basis for concluding that the regulated activity
affected interstate commerce? Under this more permissive interpretation, Congress federalized many aspects of the criminal law. Affected
activities included the non-payment of child support,4 drive-by shootings,5 terrorism, money laundering, 7 animal enterprise terrorism,'

been, freely granted; and we are brought to the final and decisive inquiry, whether
here that effect is direct, as the "Preamble" recites, or indirect. The distinction is
not formal, but substantial in the highest degree, as we pointed out in the
"If the commerce clauge were construed," we there said, "to
Schechter Case......
reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect
upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the
activities of the people, and the authority of the state over its domestic concerns
would exist only by sufferance of the federal government Indeed, on such a theory, even the development of the state's commercial facilities would be subject to
federal control." It was also pointed out, that "the distinction between direct and
indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce must be recognized as a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system."
Id. at 307 (citations omitted) (quoting A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295
U.S. 495, 546).
In Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the Court struck down a federal statute
which prohibited the shipment across state lines of goods made with prohibited child labor.
3. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) ("[W]here we find
that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for
finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end."). For example, in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), the Court
upheld the Consumer Credit Protection Act without requiring proof that the particular transaction involved interstate commerce. The Court held that intrastate loan sharking constituted
a significant aspect of the operation of organized crime, and that it had an adverse effect on
interstate commerce.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1994) (providing fines and imprisonment for those who kill,
attempt to kill, or intend to cause serious injury to a U.S. national who is outside the U.S.).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1994). The law provides, in part, as follows:
(a) Offense.-Whoever(1) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes to be used the
mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, for the purpose of causing
physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise; and
(2) intentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning of an animal
enterprise by intentionally stealing, damaging, or causing the loss of, any property
(including animals or records) used by the animal enterprise, and thereby causes
economic damage exceeding $10,000 to that enterprise, or conspires to do so;
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computer fraud and abuse,9 the malicious destruction of property,"
the manufacture of marijuana, "2 and
carjacking," aiding and abetting
3
a host of other activities.1
The federalization of criminal law did not occur in isolation; on
the contrary, it coincided with a broad national trend towards federalization and centralization which extended to virtually all sectors of the
U.S. economy. This expansion was a direct result of the constitutional
crisis which produced, not only a more deferential approach to legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause, but also the removal of other
limits on the scope of Congress' legislative power (i.e., the Court
abandoned the nondelegation doctrine, 4 and no longer viewed the
Tenth Amendment as an independent limitation on federal power 5 ).
The result was that Congress chose to regulate more activities, and

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Id.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (prohibiting the armed theft of an, automobile from the
presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation).
12. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994).
13. Included are the following crimes: possession of firearms by convicted felons, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994); possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(k) (1994); possession of machine guns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994); and the obstruction of commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994).
14. The Court applied this doctrine in only two cases, both of which were decided in
the mid-1930s. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ("Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment which . . . . [It] states but a truism . ... There is noth...).
ing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory.
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delegated ever more responsibility to administrative agencies. 6 The
federal government mushroomed in size and responsibility. 7

16. Some commentators have argued for a more restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause. For example, Professor Richard Epstein contended that "the expansive construction of the [commerce] clause accepted by the New Deal Supreme Court is wrong, and
clearly so . . . ." Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA.
L. REV. 1387, 1388 (1987). Professor Epstein argued that the clause's scope should be far
more limited: "The affirmative scope of the commerce power should be limited to those
matters that today are governed by the dormant commerce clause: interstate transportation,
navigation and sales; and the activities closely incident to them. All else should be left to
the states." Id. at 1454.
Professor Epstein was aware of the far-reaching consequences of his argument, and
he struggled with those consequences:
I realize that this conclusion seems radical because of the way the clock has
turned. One is hesitant to require dismantling of large portions of the modem federal government, given the enormous reliance interests that have been created. And
I do not have, nor do I know of anyone who has, a good theory that explains
when it is appropriate to correct past errors that have become embedded in the
legal system. It is far easier to keep power from the hands of government officials
than it is to wrest it back from them once it has been conferred. We had our
chance with the commerce clause, and we have lost it.
Still, the argument from principle seems clear enough, even if one is left at a
loss as to what should be done about it. And in a sense that is just the point.
Congress and the courts can proceed merrily on their way if they are convinced
that the basis for an extensive federal commerce power is rooted firmly in the
original constitutional text or structure. But uneasiness necessarily creeps into the
legislative picture if, as I have argued, the commerce clause is far narrower in
scope than modem courts have held. There is a powerful tension between the legacy of the past fifty years and the original constitutional understanding. It is a tension that we must face, even if we cannot resolve it.
ld at 1454-55.
17. See Honorable Vincent A. Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the Congressional Commerce Power, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 901 (1987):
[O]ur national political scene has witnessed a ferocious debate over growing
federal government Huge budget deficits have resulted, in part, from the public's
desire to maintain public services without a parallel commitment to fund these
services. Recently, congressional opponents of the mounting deficits have imposed
an automatic limit on spending. Nevertheless, the most effective check on spending
may exist in the text of the Constitution itself. Indeed, because much of the
growth of the federal government has been pursuant to the commerce clause, a
more restrictive reading of that clause may aid in limiting governmental growth
and federal deficits.
Id. at 901-02.
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In United States v. Lopez, 8 for the first time in nearly six decades, the judiciary reasserted itself. In that case, the Court struck
down the Gun Free School Zones Act (Gun Free Schools Act) as applied to a student who brought a gun to school. The Court held that
Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. 9 Lopez
set off a storm of controversy. One commentator described Lopez as
"'one of the opening cannonades in the coming constitutional revolution."' 2 ° Another stated that "[tlhe Lopez holding, even as cautiously
explained by Chief Justice Rehnquist [is], as Justice John P. Stevens
says in dissent, 'radical.' There is no other way to reverse nearly 60
years of2 total deference to Congress on the meaning of the commerce
clause." '
Was Lopez "'one of the opening cannonades in the coming constitutional revolution?"' Undoubtedly, Lopez marks the end of an era of
extreme deference to legislative determinations, but will it lead to an
avalanche of decisions striking down federal statutes, and does it signal
a return to pre-1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence? In fact, Lopez
18. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
19. Id. at 1626. The Court added:
In the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Congress made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The Act neither regulates a commercial activity
nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. We hold that the Act exceeds the authority of Congress "[t]o
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . ." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8,
cl. 3.
Id.
20. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Judging with Pinpoint Accuracy, THE RECORDER, May 8, 1991,
at 10 (quoting Yale Law Professor Bruce Ackerman). Another commentator described Lopez
as follows:
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez marks a revolutionary and long overdue revival of the doctrine that the federal government is
one of limited and enumerated powers. After being "asleep at the constitutional
switch" for more than fifty years, the Court's decision to invalidate an Act of
Congress on the ground that it exceeded the commerce power must be recognized
as an extraordinary event.
Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 752 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
21. Dean James L. Huffman, Lopez Pops Feds Ballooning Powers, NAT'L L.J., May
22, 1995, at A21.
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ends a period of extreme deference to legislative judgments, but the
decision's ramifications may be less profound than many initially
thought.
II.

THE HOLDING

Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's decision, and sought to
portray the Court's holding as decidedly unrevolutionary. The opinion
did not explicitly overrule or overtly question the Court's post-'37
Commerce Clause precedent. On the contrary, the opinion embraced
that precedent and strived to characterize its holding as consistent with
that precedent:
Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in an era of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause. In part, this was a recognition of the great changes that had occurred in the way business was carried on in this country. Enterprises that had once been local or at most
regional in nature had become national in scope. But the doctrinal change
also reflected a view that earlier Commerce Clause cases artificially had
constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
But even these modem-era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court warned that the
scope of the interstate commerce power "must be considered in the light
of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government." . . . Since that time, the Court has
heeded that warning and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis
existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.22

Of course, in terms of result, the opinion was decidedly revolutionary. For nearly six decades, the Court had virtually rubberstamped
congressionally-passed commercial legislation, including criminal legislation, enacted under the Commerce Clause. In Lopez, the Court articulated Madisonian themes regarding the scope of federal power. The
22. Lopez, 115 S. Ct at 1628-29 (citations ommitted).
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opinion characterized the Constitution as creating a government of
limited, enumerated, powers. And, specifically quoting James Madison,
the Court flatly stated that "' [t]he powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite."' 23 Then for the first time in over half a century, the Court seriously reviewed a federal statute to see whether Congress had exceeded
its commerce power. The Court articulated three situations in which
congressional regulation of commerce is permissible:
[W]e have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its commerce power .... First, Congress may regulate the
use of the channels of interstate commerce ....
Second, Congress is
empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities ....
Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce .....

The Court concluded that Section 922(q) did not fit within any of
the three situations:
We now turn to consider the power of Congress, in the light of this
framework, to enact § 922(q). The first two categories of authority may
be quickly disposed of: § 922(q) is not a regulation of the use of the

23. Id. at 1626 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)). In the Commerce Clause context, the Court construed this limitation as
follows:
The Gibbons Court . . . acknowledged that limitations on the commerce power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause.
"It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which
is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or
between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect
other States ...
"Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to
that commerce which concerns more States than one . .
supposes something not enumerated; and that something,

.
...

. The enumeration premust be the exclu-

sively internal commerce of a State."
Id. at 1627 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
24. Id. at 1629-30 (citations omitted).
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channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce; nor
can § 922(q) be justified as a regulation by which Congress has sought to
protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in interstate
commerce. Thus, if § 922(q) is to be sustained, it must be under the third
category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce.
... [Wle have upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulat-

ing intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the activity
substantially affected interstate commerce ....
.. .Section

92 2

(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing

to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction,
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.25
The Court might have upheld the law had the statute contained a
jurisdictional provision requiring that the firearm possession in question
affected interstate commerce.2" But the law contained no such provision. The Court might also have upheld the law had Congress made
explicit findings regarding the effect of gun possession in a school
zone on interstate commerce. But, as the Court noted, "to the extent
that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate

25. Id. at 1630-31 (footnote omitted). In a later portion of the opinion, the Court
continued this theme:
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic
activity that might through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort
of interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school;
there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and
there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete
tie to interstate commerce.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1634.
26. Id. at 1631 ("[Section] 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce.").
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commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the
naked eye, they are lacking here." 7
The opinion then expressed specific concerns about the scope of
federal power. The Court rejected the notion that guns in schools have
a definite impact on "national productivity." 8 The Court noted that, if
Congress were free to regulate in this case, it would be free to regulate
virtually all aspects of the educational process and society:29
[U]nder the Government's "national productivity" reasoning, Congress
could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce,
and child custody), for example. Under the theories that the Government
presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to
accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.

27. Id. at 1362.
28. Id. The government argued:
[TI]hat § 922(q) is valid because possession of a firearm in a local school zone
does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce. The Government argues that
possession of a firearm in a school zone may result in violent crime and that
violent crime can be expected to affect the functioning of the national economy in
two ways. First, the costs of violent crime are substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population. Second, violent
crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country
that are perceived to be unsafe. The Government also argues that the presence of
guns in schools poses a substantial threat to the educational process by threatening
the learning environment. A handicapped educational process, in turn, will result in
a less productive citizenry. That, in turn, would have an adverse effect on the
Nation's economic well-being. As a result, the Government argues that Congress
could rationally have concluded that § 922(q) substantially affects interstate commerce.
Id. (citations omitted).
29. The Court noted:
[I]f Congress can, pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, regulate activities that
adversely affect the learning environment, then, a fortiori, it also can regulate the
educational process directly. Congress could determine that a school's curriculum
has a "significant" effect on the extent of classroom learning. As a result, Congress
could mandate a federal curriculum for local elementary and secondary schools because what is taught in local schools has a significant "effect on classroom learning," and that, in turn, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1633 (citation omitted).
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To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power
of the sort retained by the States. ... o

If that were to happen, then the distinction between "national" and
"local" activities would disappear.3
Although Justice Rehnquist tried to portray his opinion as consistent with the Court's modem Commerce Clause decisions, his result
and approach were strikingly inconsistent with those decisions. In its
modem precedent, the Court had reviewed commercial legislation under
a rational basis analysis. As the Court stated in Katzenbach v.
McClung,32 "where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts
and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end."33 If the Court had applied the rational basis test
to the Gun Free Schools Act, it would have been forced to sustain that
Act. Justice Breyer made this point in his dissent: Congress had the
power to pass the Act "as this Court has understood [Congress' Commerce Clause power] over the last half-century."34
Justice Breyer construed that precedent as giving Congress the
right to "regulate local activities insofar as they significantly affect
interstate commerce,"35 and as requiring the Court to "give Congress a

30. Id. at 1632.
31. The Court conceded:
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving
great deference to congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has
suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed
any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. This
we are unwilling to do.
Id. at 1634 (citations omitted).
32. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
33. Id. at 303-04.
34. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35. The Court stated:
As this Court put the matter almost 50 years ago:
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degree of leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual
'
connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce."36
Justice Breyer characterized this deferential approach as requiring affirmance if Congress' determinations had a "rational basis."37 Justice
Breyer then sought to demonstrate that Congress had a rational basis
for concluding that the presence of guns in a school zone affects commerce:
[N]umerous reports and studies

-

generated both inside and outside gov-

ernment - make clear that Congress could reasonably have found the
empirical connection that its law, implicitly or explicitly, asserts ....
Having found that guns in schools significantly undermine the quality
of education in our Nation's classrooms, Congress could also have found,

given the effect of education upon interstate and foreign commerce, that
gun-related violence in and around schools is a commercial, as well as a
human, problem. Education, although far more than a matter of economics,
has long been inextricably intertwined with the Nation's economy ....
The economic links I have just sketched seem fairly obvious. Why
then is it not equally obvious, in light of those links, that a widespread,
serious, and substantial physical threat to teaching and leaming also substantially threatens the commerce to which that teaching and learning is in-

extricably tied? That is to say, guns in the hands of six percent of innercity high school students and gun-related violence throughout a city's

schools must threaten the trade and commerce that those schools support.
The only question, then, is whether the latter threat is (to use the
majority's terminology) "substantial." And, the evidence of (1) the extent
of the gun-related violence problem, (2) the extent of the resulting nega-

tive effect on classroom learning and (3) the extent of the consequent
negative commercial effects, when taken together, indicate a threat to trade
and commerce that is "substantial." At the very least, Congress could
rationally have concluded that the links are "substantial. 38

"[l]t is enough that the individual activity when multiplied into a general practice ...contains a threat to the interstate economy that requires preventative regulation." Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 236, 68 S. Ct. 996, 1006, 92 L. Ed. 1328 (1948) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1658.
36. Id. at 1658. Justice Breyer concluded that the Court was obligated to be deferential "both because the Constitution delegates the commerce power directly to Congress and
because the determination requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a legislature is more
likely than a court to make with accuracy." Id.
37. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J.,dissenting).
38. Id. at 1659 (citations omitted). Justice Breyer continued:
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Justice Breyer argued that the Gun Free Schools Act did not transgress
the boundaries between state and federal authority,39 and concluded by

Specifically, Congress could have found that gun-related violence near
the classroom poses a serious economic threat (1) to consequently inadequately educated workers who must endure low paying jobs, and (2) to
communities and businesses that might (in today's "information society")
otherwise gain, from a well-educated work force, an important commercial advantage ....
The violence-related facts, the educational facts,
and the economic facts, taken together, make this conclusion rational.
And, because under our case law, the sufficiency of the constitutionally
necessary Commerce Clause link between a crime of violence and interstate commerce turns simply upon size or degree, those same facts make
the statute constitutional.
Id. at 1661 (citations omitted).
Justice Breyer went on to say:
Increasing global competition also has made primary and secondary education economically more important. The portion of the American economy
attributable to international trade nearly tripled between 1950 and 1980, and
more than 70 percent of American-made goods now compete with imports.
Yet, lagging worker productivity has contributed to negative trade balances
and to real hourly compensation that has fallen below wages in 10 other
industrialized nations. At least some significant part of this serious productivity problem is attributable to students who emerge from classrooms without
the reading or mathematical skills necessary to compete with their European
or Asian counterparts and, presumably, to high school dropout rates of 20 to
25 percent (up to 50 percent in inner cities).
Id. at 1660 (citations omitted).
39. l at 1661-62. Justice Breyer noted:
To hold this statute constitutional is not to "obliterate" the "distinction of
what is national and what is local," nor is it to hold that the Commerce Clause
permits the Federal Government to "regulate any activity that it found was related
to the economic productivity of individual citizens," to regulate "marriage, divorce,
and child custody," or to regulate any and all aspects of education. For one thing,
this statute is aimed at curbing a particularly acute threat to the educational process
- the possession (and use) of life-threatening firearms in, or near, the classroom.
The empirical evidence that I have discussed above unmistakably documents the
special way in which guns and education are incompatible. This Court has previously recognized the singularly disruptive potential on interstate commerce that acts
of violence may have. For another thing, the immediacy of the connection between
education and the national economic well-being is documented by scholars and
accepted by society at large in a way and to a degree that may not hold true for
other social institutions. It must surely be the rare case, then, that a statute strikes
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arguing that "[u]pholding this legislation would do no more than simply recognize that Congress had a 'rational basis' for finding a significant connection between guns in or near schools and (through their
effect on education) the interstate and foreign commerce they threat5540

en ....

Mr. Justice Stevens, who also dissented, agreed that the Court's
recent precedent required affrmance of Congress' determinations. In
his view, "Congress has ample power to prohibit the possession of
firearms in or near schools - just as it may protect the school environment from harms posed by controlled substances such as asbestos or
alcohol."'"

at conduct that (when considered in the abstract) seems so removed from commerce, but which (practically speaking) has so significant an impact upon commerce.
In sum, a holding that the particular statute before us falls within the commerce power would not expand the scope of that Clause. Rather, it simply would
apply preexisting law to changing economic circumstances. It would recognize that
in today's economic world, gun-related violence near the classroom makes a significant difference to our economic, as well as our social, well-being. In accordance
with well-accepted precedent such a holding would permit Congress 'to act in
terms of economic . . . realities," would interpret the commerce power as "an
affirmative power commensurate with the national needs," and would acknowledge
that the "commerce clause does not operate so as to render the nation powerless to
defend itself against economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or destructive
of the national economy."
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1661-62 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 1665.
41. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, he argued that:
Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used to restrain
commerce. Their possession is the consequence, either directly or indirectly, of
commercial activity. In my judgment, Congress' power to regulate commerce in
firearms includes the power to prohibit possession of guns at any location because
of their potentially harmful use; it necessarily follows that Congress may also prohibit their possession in particular markets. The market for the possession of handguns by school-age children is, distressingly, substantial. Whether or not the national interest in eliminating that market would have justified federal legislation in
1789, it surely does today.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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III. LOPEZ'S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

What are Lopez's implications for the future? Does that decision
signal a radical restructuring of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence?
A. Lopez in the Supreme Court
In the short term, Lopez is unlikely to have cataclysmic effect, and
certainly does not signal a return to pre-1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The decision was rendered by a fragmented court which
produced two concurring opinions (Justices Kennedy and Thomas with
O'Connor concurring in Kennedy's opinion), and three dissenting opinions joined by four justices (Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer with
Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg joining Breyer's opinion). Several members of the Court expressed concern about the potential consequences
of a radical shift in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy supported the Court's result but felt compelled to issue a
concurring opinion urging the Court "not to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting the congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature." Justice Kennedy noted:42
[The] fundamental restraint [of stare decisis] ... forecloses us from reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18thcentury economy, dependent then upon production and trading practices
that had changed but little over the preceding centuries; it also mandates
against returning to the time when congressional authority to regulate un-

doubted commercial activities was limited by a judicial determination that
those matters had an insufficient connection to an interstate system. Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we
have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national econ43
omy.

He joined the Court's opinion only because he felt that Congress had
gone too far,4 and had intruded on state power.

42. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637.
44. Id. at 1640. The Court noted:
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Other justices also counseled restraint including dissenting Justices
Breyer 5 and Souter. Although not a swing vote, Justice Souter's dis-

The statute before us upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an
unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power, and our intervention is required . . . . [U]nlike the earlier cases to come before the Court here neither the
actors nor their conduct have a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor
the design of the statute have an evident commercial nexus . . . . The statute
makes the simple possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of the grounds of the
school a criminal offense. In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of
ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said
the commerce power may reach so far. If Congress attempts that extension, then at
the least we must inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude
upon an area of traditional state concern.
An inference of these dimensions occurs here, for it is well established that
education is a traditional concern of the States. The proximity to schools, including
of course schools owned and operated by the States or their subdivisions, is the
very premise for making the conduct criminal. In these circumstances, we have a
particular duty to insure that the federal-state balance is not destroyed.
While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person, would
argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on schol premises,
considerable disagreement exists as to how best accomplish that goal. In this circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may
perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions
where the best solution is far from clear.
The statute now before us forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history
and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term.
Id. at 1640-41 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 1650-51 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer noted:
The third legal problem created by the Court's holding is that it threatens
legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case, seemed reasonably well
settled. Congress has enacted many statutes (more than 100 sections of the United
States Code), including criminal statutes (at least 25 sections), that use the words
"affecting commerce" to define their scope and other statutes that contain no jurisdictional language at all[.] Do these, or similar, statutes regulate noncommercial
activities?
Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He went on to state that:
If so, would that alter the meaning of "affecting commerce" in a jurisdictional
element? More importantly, in the absence of a jurisdictional element, are the
courts nevertheless to take Wickard . . . (and later similar cases) as inapplicable,
and to judge the effect of a single noncommercial activity on interstate commerce
without considering similar instances of the forbidden conduct? However these
questions are eventually resolved, the legal uncertainty now created will restrict
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sent expressly invoked the specter of the 1930s' constitutional crisis.
He reminded the Court of the "chastening experiences" which led the
Court to repudiate "an earlier and untenably expansive conception of
judicial review in derogation of congressional commerce power."46
And he expressed concern that the majority's decision "tugs the Court
off course, leading it to suggest opportunities for further developments
that would be at odds with the rule of restraint to which the Court still
wisely states adherence."47 Justice Souter then traced the history of the
Commerce Clause noting that "the period from the turn of the century
to 1937 is better noted for a series of cases applying highly formalistic
notions of 'commerce' to invalidate federal social and economic legislation ... ."48 In Justice Souter's view, the Gun Free Schools Act

Congress' ability to enact criminal laws aimed at criminal behavior that, considered
problem by problem rather than instance by instance, seriously threatens the economic, as well as social, well-being of Americans.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1664-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 1652 (Souter, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1652. Justice Souter went on to state that:
[These restrictive views of commerce subject to congressional power complemented
the Court's activism in limiting the enforceable scope of state economic regulation.
It is most familiar history that during this same period the Court routinely invalidated state social and economic legislation under an expansive conception of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. The fulcrums of judicial review in
these cases were the notions of liberty and property characteristic of laissez-faire
economics, whereas the Commerce Clause cases turned on what was ostensibly a
structural limit of federal power, but under each conception of judicial review the
Court's character for the first third of the century showed itself in exacting judicial
scrutiny of a legislature's choice of economic ends and of the legislative means
selected to reach them.
It was not merely coincidental, then, that sea changes in the Court's conceptions of its authority under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses occurred virtually together, in 1937, with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, and NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. In West Coast Hotel, the Court's rejection of a due process challenge to a state law fixing minimum wages for women and children
marked the abandonment of its expansive protection of contractual freedom. Two
weeks later, Jones & Laughlin affirmed congressional commerce power to authorize
NLRB injunctions against unfair labor practices. The Court's finding that the regulated activity had a direct enough effect on commerce has since been seen as beginning the abandonment, for practical purposes, of the formalistic distinction between direct and indirect effects.
Id. at 1652-53 (citations omitted).
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passed muster under the Court's more recent precedent49 and did not
improperly infringe the scope of state authority." Justice Souter also
argued that the Court's tendency to apply rational basis review in
Commerce Clause cases constitutes "'a paradigm of judicial
restraint""'5 and "reflects our respect for the institutional competence
of the Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's

49. The Court noted:
The suggestion is either that a connection between commerce and these subjects is remote, or that the commerce power is simply weaker when it touches
subjects on which the States have historically been the primary legislators. Neither
suggestion is tenable. As for remoteness, it may or may not be wise for the National Government to deal with education, but Justice BREYER has surely demonstrated that the commercial prospects of an illiterate State or Nation are not rosy,
and no argument should be needed to show that hijacking interstate shipments of
cigarettes can affect commerce substantially, even though the States have traditionally prosecuted robbery. And as for the notion that the commerce power diminishes
the closer it gets to customary state concerns, that idea has been flatly rejected,
and not long ago. The commerce power, we have often observed, is plenary. Justice Harlan put it this way in speaking for the Court in Maryland v. Wirtz:
"There is no general doctrine implied in the Federal Constitution that the two
governments, national and state, are each to exercise its powers so as not to interfere with the free and full exercise of the powers of the other . . . . [lit is clear
that the Federal Government, when acting within a delegated power, may override
countervailing state interests . . . . As long ago as [1925], the Court put to rest
the contention that state concerns might constitutionally 'outweigh' the importance
of an otherwise valid federal statute regulating commerce."
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654-55 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195-96 (1968)).
50. The Court noted:
[O]ur hesitance to presume that Congress has acted to alter the state-federal status
quo (when presented with a plausible alternative) has no relevance whatever to the
enquiry whether it has the commerce power to do so or to the standard of judicial
review when Congress has definitely meant to exercise that power. Indeed, to allow
our hesitance to affect the standard of review would inevitably degenerate into the
sort of substantive policy review that the Court found indefensible 60 years ago.
The Court does not assert (and could not plausibly maintain) that the commerce
power is wholly devoid of congressional authority to speak on any subject of traditional state concern; but if congressional action is not forbidden absolutely when it
touches such a subject, it will stand or fall depending on the Court's view of the
strength of the legislation's commercial justification.
Id. at 1655.
51. Id. at 1651 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101
(1993)).
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political accountability in dealing with matters open to a wide range of
possible choices."52
Thus, six justices expressed concern for stare decisis. And, although Justices Kennedy and O'Connor joined in the Court's judgment,
they argued for a more moderate application of Lopez's holding. Only
one justice, Justice Thomas, pushed for more sweeping changes in the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and his opinion was not
joined by any other justice. Justice Thomas argued that the Court
should undertake a review of the Court's precedent under the Commerce Clause:
[O]ur case law has drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. In a future case, we ought to temper our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our more recent case
law and is more faithful to the original understanding of that Clause. 3

He then urged the Court to return to a more historically justified approach to the Commerce Clause54 and the Tenth Amendment:5
[Our] cases all establish a simple point: from the time of the ratification of the Constitution to the mid-1930's, it was widely understood that
the Constitution granted Congress only limited powers, notwithstanding the

52. Id. at 1651-52.

53. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
54. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643-45 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted that
"[a]t the time the original Constitution was ratified, 'commerce' consisted of selling, buying,
and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes." Id. at 1643.
55. The Court noted:
Our construction of the scope of congressional authority has the additional
problem of coining close to turning the Tenth Amendment on its head. Our case
law could be read to reserve to the United States all powers not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Taken together, these fundamental textual problems should,
at the very least, convince us that the "substantial effects" test should be reexamined.
In short, the Founding Fathers were well aware of what the principal dissent
calls "'economic . . . realities."' Even though the boundary between commerce and

other matters may ignore "economic reality" and thus seem arbitrary or artificial to
some, we must nevertheless respect a constitutional line that does not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce.
Id. at 1645-46.
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Commerce Clause. Moreover, there was no question that activities wholly
separated from business, such as gun possession, were beyond the reach of
the commerce power. If anything, the "wrong turn" was the Court's dramatic departure in the 1930's from a century and a half of precedent. 6

Justice Thomas took particular issue with the "substantial effects" test
which he viewed as historically unjustified 7 and as having permitted

Congress to exercise sweeping power

8

with few limits. 9 He con-

56. Id. at 1649 (footnote omitted).
57. The Court noted:
Put simply, much if not all of Art. I, § 8 (including portions of the Commerce Clause itself) would be surplusage if Congress had been given authority over
matters that substantially affect interstate commerce. An interpretation of cl.3 that
makes the rest of § 8 superfluous simply cannot be correct. Yet this Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence has endorsed just such an interpretation: the power we
have accorded Congress has swallowed Art. I, § 8.
Id. at 1644.
58. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642-43 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted:
"[w]e have said that Congress may regulate ...anything that has a 'substantial effect' on
[interstate] commerce. This test, if taken to its logical extreme, would give Congress a 'police power' over all aspects of American life." Id. at 1642.
59. The Court noted:
[T]he substantial effects test suffers from the further flaw that it appears to grant
Congress a police power over the Nation. When asked at oral argument if there
were any limits to the Commerce Clause, the Government was at a loss for words.
Likewise, the principal dissent insists that there are limits, but it cannot muster
even one example.
The substantial effects test suffers from this flaw, in part, because of its "aggregation principle." Under so-called "class of activities" statutes, Congress can
regulate whole categories of activities that are not themselves either "interstate" or
"commerce." In applying the effects test, we ask whether the class of activities as
whole substantially affects interstate commerce, not whether any specific activity
within the class has such effects when considered in isolation.
The aggregation principle is clever, but has no stopping point. Suppose all
would agree that gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school does not substantially affect commerce, but that possession of weapons generally (knives, brass knuckles, nunchakus, etc.) does. Under our substantial effects doctrine, even though Congress cannot single out gun possession, it can prohibit weapon possession generally.
But one always can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity that, when
taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on commerce. Under our
jurisprudence, if Congress passed an omnibus "substantially affects interstate commerce" statute, purporting to regulate every aspect of human existence, the Act
apparently would be constitutional. Even though particular sections may govern
only trivial activities, the statute in the aggregate regulates matters that substantially
affect commerce.
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cluded by noting that "[a]t an appropriate juncture, I think we must
modify our Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Today, it is easy enough
to say that the Clause certainly does not empower Congress to ban gun
possession within 1,000 feet of a school."6 In his view, this modification need not be "radical."'"
Thus far, at least, the Court has not been inclined to follow Justice
Thomas' concurrence. In two post-Lopez actions, the Court had the
chance to extend Lopez to other contexts and refused to do so. In the
first case, United States v. Robertson,62 respondent was convicted on
various narcotics offenses as well as for a violation of Section 1962(a)
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 3 .
In an effort to satisfy RICO's jurisdictional requirement, the government alleged that respondent had invested the proceeds of unlawful
activities in a gold mine. The Ninth Circuit reversed the RICO conviction on the basis that the Government had failed to prove that the gold
mine was "engaged in or affect[ed] interstate commerce. 6' The Court
disagreed finding that respondent had engaged in or affected interstate
65
commerce.

Id. at 1649-50 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 1651.
61. The Court noted:
This extended discussion of the original understanding and our first century
and a half of case law does not necessarily require a wholesale abandonment of
our more recent opinions. It simply reveals that our substantial effects test is far
removed from both the Constitution and from our early case law and that the
Court's opinion should not be viewed as "radical" or another "wrong turn" that
must be corrected in the future. The analysis also suggests that we ought to temper
our Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Id. at 1650 (footnoted omitted).
62. 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995).
63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 to 1968 (1994).
64. United States v. Robertson, 15 F.3d 862, 868 (1994).
65. The Court noted:
The facts relevant to the "engaged in or affecting interstate commerce" issue
were as follows: Some time in 1985, Robertson entered into a partnership agreement with another man, whereby he agreed to finance a goldmining operation in
Alaska. In fulfillment of this obligation, Robertson, who resided in Arizona, made
a cash payment of $125,000 for placer gold mining claims near Fairbanks. He paid
approximately $100,000 (in cash) for mining equipment and supplies, some of
which were purchased in Los Angeles and transported to Alaska for use in the
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In the second case, Cargill, Inc. v. United States,66 the Court refused to grant certiorari. Obviously, the decision whether to grant certiorari is discretionary, and should not be given much weight. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Thomas, in his dissent to the Court's decision to
deny certiorari, focused on the constitutionality of the Clean Water
Act. The Army Corps of Engineers tried to apply the Act to water
pools on petitioner's land where migratory birds land. Relying on
Lopez, Justice Thomas raised questions regarding the Act's validity.67

mine. Robertson also hired and paid the expenses for seven out-of-state employees
to travel to Alaska to work in the mine. The partnership dissolved during the first
mining season, but Robertson continued to operate the mine through 1987 as a sole
proprietorship. He again hired a number of employees from outside Alaska to work
in the mine. During its operating life, the mine produced between $200,000 and
$290,000 worth of gold, most of which was sold to refiners within Alaska, although Robertson personally transported approximately $30,000 worth of gold out
of the State.
Most of the parties' arguments, here and in the Ninth Circuit; were addressed
to the question whether the activities of the gold mine "affected" interstate commerce. We have concluded we do not have to consider that point. The "affecting
commerce" test was developed in our jurisprudence to define the extent of
Congress's power over purely intrastate commercial activities that nonetheless have
substantial interstate effects. The proof at Robertson's trial, however, focused largely on the interstate activities of Robertson's mine. For example, the Government
proved that Robertson purchased at least $100,000 worth of equipment and supplies
for use in the mine. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' suggestion, all of those
items were not purchased locally ("drawn generally from the stream of interstate
commerce"); the Government proved that some of them were purchased in California and transported to Alaska for use in the mine's operations. The Government
also proved that, on more than one occasion, Robertson sought workers from out
of state and brought them to Alaska to work in the mine. Furthermore, Robertson,
the mine's sole proprietor, took $30,000 worth of gold, or 15% of the mine's total
output with him out of the State.
Whether or not these activities met (and whether or not, to bring the gold
mine within the "affecting commerce" provision of RICO, they would have to
meet) the requirement of substantially affecting interstate commerce, they assuredly
brought the gold mine within § 1962(a)'s alternative criterion of "any enterprise . . . engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce." As we said in American Building Maintenance, a corporation is generally "engaged 'in commerce'
when it is itself "directly engaged in the production, distribution, or acquisition of
goods and services in interstate commerce."
Robertson, 115 S. Ct. at 1732-33 (citations omitted).
66. 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995).
67. The Court noted:
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After noting that the pools "have never been, are not now, and probably will never be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce," 68 Justice Thomas questioned whether they substantially affect
commerce.69 But Justice Thomas could not muster enough votes to
have the case heard.

Only last Term, we held that possession of a firearm in a local school zone
does not substantially affect interstate commerce. The basis asserted to create federal jurisdiction over petitioner's land in this case seems to me to be even more farfetched than that offered, and rejected, in Lopez. At least in Lopez the Government
could assert that the presence of weapons in and around schools may result in violent crime that affects education and, hence, the economy. In this case, the Corps'
basis for jurisdiction rests entirely on the actual or potential presence of migratory
birds on petitioner's land. In light of Lopez, I have serious doubts about the propriety of the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over petitioner's land in this case.
Id. at 408 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
68. Id.
69. The Court noted:
Apparently, the Corps' regulations are based on the assumption, improper in
my opinion, that the self-propelled flight of birds across state lines creates a sufficient interstate nexus to justify the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over any standing water that could serve as a habitat for migratory birds. As the Court of Appeals admitted, the Corps' expansive interpretation of its regulatory powers under
the Clean Water Act may test the very "bounds of reason," and, in my mind,
likely stretches Congress' Commerce Clause powers beyond the breaking point.
Both the Court of Appeals and the Government rely on the Seventh Circuit's
declaration of an interstate nexus in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256,
261 (1993): "throughout North America, millions of people annually spend more
than a billion dollars on hunting, trapping, and observing migratory birds." That is
no doubt true, and I do not challenge Congress' power to preserve migratory birds
and their habitat through legitimate means. However, that substantial interstate commerce depends on the continued existence of migratory birds does not give the
Corps carte blanche authority to regulate every property that migratory birds use or
could use as habitat. The point of Lopez was to explain that the activity on the
land to be regulated must substantially affect interstate commerce before Congress
can regulate it pursuant to its Commerce Clause power.
Other than the occasional presence of migratory birds, there was no showing
that petitioner's land use would have any effect on interstate commerce, much less
a substantial effect. Nor was there any showing that the cumulative effect of land
use involving seasonal standing water - water that is wholly isolated from any
water used, or usable, in interstate commerce - would have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
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Even though Lopez did not overturn the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, Lopez did produce a significant difference in the Court's
approach to Commerce Clause issues. The deferential approach used in
cases like Katzenbach," in which the Court applied rational basis review, was rejected by a substantial number of justices. Justice
Rehnquist's first reference to the rational basis test was an historical
reference. 7 His second reference came when he responded to the
government's argument "that Congress could rationally have concluded
that § 922(q) substantially affects interstate commerce."72 When
Rehnquist finally addressed the test head-on, he rejected it:
Justice BREYER rejects our reading of precedent and argues that
"Congress . . . could rationally conclude that schools fall on the commercial side of the line." Again, Justice BREYER's rationale lacks any real
limits because, depending on the level of generality, any activity can be
looked upon as commercial .. ..

Thus, if Justice Rehnquist has his way, the era of blind deference to
legislative determinations would be over.
What test replaces the rational basis test? Justice Rehnquist's opinion focuses on whether the regulated activity has a "substantial" relationship to interstate commerce. To the extent that Congress is not
regulating the channels of interstate commerce themselves, or attempting to "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce," Congress can only
regulate when the activity being regulated has a "substantial relation"

70. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
71. The Court noted:
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court warned that the scope of the interstate
commerce power "must be considered in the light of' our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society,
would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government." Since that time, the Court
has heeded that warning and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed
for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 1632.
73. Id. at 1633 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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to interstate commerce."74 In Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun
Free Schools Act because it found that
the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic

activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any
sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local
school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate
commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm
have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.S

Although the Lopez decision may not result in a complete reversal
of the Court's post-'37 precedent, or the invalidation of numerous
federal statutes, that decision will likely force Congress to be more
careful in exercising its Commerce Clause power. If Congress wishes
to spare future legislation the same fate as the Gun Free schools Act,
it will need to provide more support in the form of a jurisdictional
provision, requiring that an activity being criminalized affect interstate
commerce, or in the form of specific findings regarding the effect of
the activity on interstate commerce. If Lopez forces Congress to more
carefully delineate its findings, the decision may have a healthy effect
on the legislative process.
B. Lopez in the federal courts
In the lower federal courts, Lopez generated a predictable avalanche of litigation challenging other federal statutes.76 Defendants eagerly embraced Lopez in the hope of avoiding prosecution or overturning a conviction. But these so-called "Lopez challenges" have not been
well-received. The lower courts have upheld numerous federal criminal
statutes prohibiting many different types of conduct: the non-payment
of child support,77 the use or possession of weapons," possession of

74. Id. at 1629.
75. Id. at 1634.

76. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Edwards, 894 F.
Supp. 340, 342-43 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1995). The Court noted:

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss3/8

24

Weaver: Lopez and the Federalization of Criminal Law

1996]

LOPEZAND CRIMINAL LAW FEDERALIZATION

a firearm by a convicted felon," possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers,8" possession of an unregistered destructive device,8 ' conspiracy to possess an unregistered firearm, 2 possession or
transfer of a machine gun," malicious destruction of property,84 the
use of a residence located within 1000 feet of a secondary school for
the distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine, 5 possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute,86 the obstruction of commerce, 7 and aiding
and abetting the manufacture of marijuana.88 In addition, the courts
have upheld the Hobbs Act, 9 the Drug Act,9" the federal carjacking
statute,9 ' and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act.9 In

We note that intrastate drug activity affects interstate commerce, that Congress may
regulate both interstate and intrastate drug trafficking under the Commerce Clause,
and that section 841(a)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. Because Brown's section 924(c)(1) conviction is based on his section 841(a)(1)
drug trafficking offense which involved "an activity that substantially affect[ed]
interstate commerce," we reject Brown's Lopez challenge.
Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Hinton, 69 F.3d 534 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 1995).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d 946 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding
18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (1994)).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Dodge, 61 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding 26
U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994)).
82. See, e.g., Dodge, 61 F.3d at 142 (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994)).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(o) (1994)); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422 (7th
Cir. 1995).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154 (5th Cir. 1995).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Kremetis, 903 F. Supp. 250 (D.N.H. 1995).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995) (challenging
section 401(a)(1) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(1994)).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Bramble, 894 F. Supp. 1384, 1394-96 (D. Haw. 1995);
United States v. Gonzalez, 893 F. Supp. 935 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding a statute
prohibiting the armed theft of an automobile from the presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 234 (8th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Carolina, 61 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 1995).
92. See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
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one case, a sheriff unsuccessfully tried to use Lopez to challenge the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which required him to run
background checks on those wishing to purchase handguns.93
This response by the lower courts could have been predicted. Under the "modem view" of the Commerce Clause, which has been
taught in law schools for decades, the idea of striking down a federal
statute on the ground that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause is a "radical" concept. When Congress passes legislation under the Commerce Clause, the courts are supposed to "defer"
to rational legislative judgments. The Lopez decision, surprising as it
was, did not break lower-court judges out of this mindset.
In a significant number of Lopez challenges, the lower courts summarily reject the challenge.94 Most of these decisions distinguish or
limit Lopez.95 For example, in United States v. Bell,96 the Court upheld a federal law prohibiting the possession of a weapon by a con93. See, e.g., Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Hinton, 69 F.3d 534 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Clark, 67 F.3d 1154 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir.
1995).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Shelton, 66 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir.
1995). In United States v. Kirk, the court stated that:
It is particularly important to our determination that section 922(o) prohibits
the private possession or transfer of machineguns only if they were not lawfully
possessed prior to May 19, 1986. Thus, transfer or possession of a machinegun is
unlawful under this section only if it was manufactured or illegally transferred after
May 19, 1986. It is clear, therefore, that the activity Congress intended to prohibit
by application of section 922(o) was the introduction into the stream of commerce
machineguns manufactured, imported, or otherwise illegally obtained, after the effective date of the act. When read as a whole, it is plain that the activities prohibited by section 922(o) constitute commerce . ..
Section 922(o) is restricted to a narrow class of highly destructive, sophisticated weapons that have been either manufactured or imported after enactment of the
Firearms Owners Protection Act, which is more suggestive of a nexus to or affect
on interstate or foreign commerce than possession of any firearms whatever, no
matter when or where originated, within one thousand feet of the grounds of any
school . . ..
Thus, section 922(o) falls into the first category identified by the Supreme
Court in Lopez: a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce.
70 F.3d 791, 796 (1995) (citations and footnotes omitted).
96. 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1995).
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victed felon.97 The court concluded that the statute "contains an explicit requirement that a nexus to interstate commerce be established." 98 In United States v. Bolton,99 the court upheld the Hobbs
Act which prohibited the obstruction of commerce. The court held
"that the Hobbs Act regulates activities which in aggregate have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. In enacting the Hobbs Act,
Congress determined that robbery and extortion are activities which
through repetition may have substantial detrimental effects on interstate
100
commerce."
Even those courts that engage in more extended review of federal
statutes tend to tread very carefully. For example, United States v.
Bishop,' involved a Lopez challenge to the federal carjacking statute. In affirming, the Third Circuit noted that "[w]e are called upon in
this case principally to perform one of our most delicate duties - determining whether Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in
enacting a federal law."'0° The court noted the government's alleged

97. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
98. Bell, 70 F.3d at 498.
99. 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995).
100. Id. at 399. The Court further noted:
Unlike possession of a firearm in a school zone, therefore, robbery and extortion
are activities that through repetition can substantially affect interstate commerce.
Because the Hobbs Act regulates activities that in aggregate have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, "the de minimis character of individual instances
arising under that statute is of no consequence." As a result, our precedent construing the Hobbs Act to require only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce in
individual instances is consistent with Lopez. We therefore conclude the Hobbs Act
represents a permissible exercise of the authority granted to Congress under the
Commerce Clause, and that under Lopez, all the government need show is a de
minimis effect on interstate commerce in order to support a conviction under the
Act.
Id.
101. 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995).
102. Id. at 571. The court went on to state that:
Appellants contend that the Supreme Court's Lopez decision is a sharp break
with the Court's precedents. According to them, "the Lopez decision is a strong
signal to the lower courts to eschew a casual calculus of whether interstate commerce is substantially implicated in a federal statutory scheme in favor of a carefully considered factual determination." We, however, do not believe that Lopez
calls for federal courts to supplant Congressional judgments with their own. That
would, indeed, be a profound departure from prior law, and it is important to keep
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justification for the statute: "(1) Congress had a rational basis for believing that carjacking substantially affects interstate commerce; and (2)
section 2119 has, as an element of the offense, a requirement that there
be a constitutionally adequate nexus with interstate commerce."' 3 The
court accepted both arguments. In doing so, the court articulated the
need for deference to congressional determinations, °4 suggesting that
the primary check on legislative abuse is political:.. 5
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence makes it abundantly clear that our
job in this case is not to second-guess the legislative judgment of Congress that carjacking substantially affects interstate commerce, but rather to
ensure that Congress had a rational basis for that conclusion." 6

After summarizing extensive congressional testimony regarding the
economic effects of carjacking, the court upheld the statute.' °7
in mind that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, who fully concurred in the majority
opinion, did not view the majority that way. Rather, Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor counseled "great restraint" before a court finds Congress to have overstepped its commerce power, and believed the Court's opinion to have been a
"necessary though limited holding." Thus, despite protestations to the contrary, the
winds have not shifted that much.
Id. at 590 (citations omitted).
103.

Id. at 576.

104. Id. at 576-77. The Court noted:
Although ultimately the federal courts are the arbiters of constitutional questions, "the Commerce Clause grants Congress extensive power and ample discretion
to determine its appropriate exercise." We therefore must give substantial deference
to a Congressional determination that it had the power to enact particular legislation. .

.

. Deference to Congressional judgments about the contours of Commerce

Clause power stems in part, as Justice Kennedy explained, from the fact that Congress is a coordinate branch of the federal government charged with the
government's legislative authority.
Bishop, 60 F.3d at 576-77 (citations omitted).
105. "Indeed, the primary check upon Congressional action is its direct responsibility to
the will of the people." Id.
106. Id. at 577.

107. The Court noted:
Together, the findings and floor statements - and the structure of the Act
itself - suggest the following. Congress specifically found that auto theft is an
interstate problem - both that it is often an interstate business itself (albeit an
illegal one) and that it gnawed away at the innards of the American economy by
imposing other costs on society as well. Congress believed that auto theft was a
vast, illicit trade substantially affecting interstate and foreign commerce. Auto theft
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The Bishop court was also presented with the argument that:
Lopez created a 'bright line' rule that unless an activity is 'commercial' or
'economic,' it is beyond the power of Congress to regulate no matter what
its effect upon interstate commerce. Because carjacking is not 'commercial'
or 'economic,' appellants contend, it is simply beyond the power of Congress to regulate. 8

This argument received some support from Justice Kennedy's Lopez
concurrence." 9 Nevertheless, the court rejected the argument:
The Court in Lopez disapproved of the statute at issue because possession
of a handgun was neither economic nor "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." By contrast, we can

easily appreciate how Congress could readily (and rationally) have believed
that carjacking is both economically motivated and part of a greater economic activity."'

The court also rejected the argument that the "costs of crime" can
"support a finding that an activity substantially affects interstate com11
merce."

costs consumers both through the direct economic losses caused by having their
property taken from them, and through increased insurance costs. Congress further
believed that carjacking was not mere joyriding, but a new and violent form of the
illicit interstate business of auto theft. Finally, Congress believed that the national
problem of auto theft required a comprehensive, national response addressing the
many different aspects of the auto theft problem, because prior state efforts had
failed to combat the problem effectively.
Id. at 580.
108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. Bishop, 68 F.3d at 581 (citations omitted). The court went on to state that:
Indeed, the rationale supporting such a conclusion, and distinguishing this
case from Lopez, is patently obvious. First, carjacking is economic in a way
that possession of a handgun in a school zone is not. When a criminal
points a gun at a victim and takes his or her car, the criminal has made an
economic gain and the victim has suffered an undeniable and substantial loss.
Replicated 15,000 or 20,000 times per year, the economic effects are indeed
profound. By comparison, no matter how many criminals possess guns in
school zones, there is no direct economic effect that arises from the crimes.
Id at 580-81 (citations omitted).
111. The Court noted that:

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 8

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:815

Judge Becker concurred in part and dissented in part. Although he
agreed that carjacking is a heinous offense,' he rejected the court's
holding that Congress has the power to pass a carjacking statute. He
began by noting that "[s]ix months ago the majority's opinion would
have carried the day. But that was before United States v. Lopez,
which, fairly read, reflects a sea change in the Supreme Court's approach to these types of questions." ' In his view Lopez is "a beacon
that we must follow, and the direction in which the beacon points
compels my vote to invalidate the carjacking statute as beyond the
broad reach of Congress's Commerce Clause power."'".4 He stated:
In enacting this criminal statute, Congress improperly interfered with the
primary authority of New Jersey to define and enforce its criminal code.
Intrastate crimes of violence, like the carjacking in this case, are properly
left to the slates, whose law enforcement agencies and courts are well
suited to handle such criminal activity . . ..

Judge Becker felt that the carjacking statute could not be justified
under Lopez:
It is clear that § 2119 was enacted to deal with carjacking as a crime of
violence, not, as the majority now contends, to confront the effects of
carjacking on the interstate economy. Congress has not made any findings

[I]n enacting the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Congress did not rest its findings of
substantial effect upon interstate commerce solely upon increased insurance costs,
but also relied upon the direct costs to consumers from lost property resulting from
auto theft. Thus, the "cost of crime" justification used by Congress in this case is
much more concrete than the theory rejected by the Court in Lopez.
Id. at 581 n.16 (citations omitted).
Appellants also argued that it is "irrational to believe that carjackers are professional
thieves out for profit. Instead, they contend, carjackings are quintessential local crimes of
violence." Id. at 581. The court rejected this argument as well:
[A]vailable information actually undercuts appellants' "common sense" assertions. In
a 1992 report on carjacking, the Department of Justice noted that one of the motives behind cariacking is "to derive a profit from the resale of the vehicle or its
parts."
Id. at 582 (citations omitted).
112. Bishop, 68 F.3d at 590 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Id. at 591 (citation omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id at 592-93.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss3/8

30

Weaver: Lopez and the Federalization of Criminal Law

1996]

LOPEZ AND CRIMiNAL LAW FEDERALIZATION

to support the conclusion that carjacking has a substantial effect on interstate commerce .... 116

Only a few lower courts have actually struck down federal statutes
117
as exceeding Congress' power. In United States v. Pappadopoulos,

Pappadopoulos raised a Lopez challenge to her arson conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 844(i)."' The arson resulted when Pappadopoulos and

116. Id. at 600. He went on to state that:
The federal carjacking statute, unlike those statutes upheld in prior cases, in
no way regulates instrumentalities in any way engaged in interstate commerce. Rather, § 2119 is a criminal statute of general application, which, by
its terms, lacks any nexus to the use of automobiles in interstate commerce ....

Id. at 597. Additionally, he stated:
The majority sweeps within its definition of commercial activity all criminal acts which involve a coercive (nonconsensual) transfer of economic benefit from victim to perpetrator. A definition of this breadth would include not
only carjacking, but also all crimes of theft. Indeed, if Chief Judge Posner is
correct, perhaps it includes all criminal activity.
[The new carjacking problem is more akin to the violent street crimes associated with street gangs and the drug subculture ....
The primary motives appear to be transportation for a getaway after
robbing the driver, a source of transportation to commit another crime,
joyriding, and to a lesser degree, to derive a profit from the resale of the
vehicle or its parts.
Id. at 597-602. The majority responded in the following way:
Congress is not obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a record of
the type that an administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial
review. Congress need not even rely solely upon evidence provided in hearings. Congress rationally believed that carijacking was a new but substantial
and growing aspect of the vast interstate auto theft problem. As we noted
earlier, Congress heard evidence that caracking was a new form of auto
theft that was spreading throughout the nation. It also was presented with
evidence that even thieves who begin as joy riders tend to become professionals - professionals who would feed the illicit auto theft aftermarket for
stolen vehicles and parts. Thus, Congress may have believed that even if a
caracker's first crime was committed for some non-economic motive, he or
she would likely soon be a part of the national auto theft problem. In such
circumstances, Congress need not have refrained from legislating until the
carjacking problem reached crisis proportions.
Id. at 582-83 (citations omitted).
117. 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995).
118. The Act read as follows:
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her husband, who were experiencing severe financial difficulties, conspired with another to bum down their 10,000 square foot home.
Pappadopoulos contended that "the residence's receipt of natural gas
from out-of-state sources was insufficient as a matter of law to estab*...""' The court
lish the requisite nexus to interstate commerce .
was receptive to the argument noting that, since the residence itself did
not move in interstate commerce, "the government must rely on
Congress's power to regulate intrastate activities that 'substantially
affect' interstate commerce."12 The government tried to meet the
"substantial effects" test by relying on Wickard v. Filburn: "even
though the effect on commerce of the destruction of one residence that
receives out-of-state gas might be trivial, the combined effect 'of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial."" 2 The Court disagreed
noting that "[t]he government's argument does not get it home free.
Lopez makes it clear that the Wickard line of cases "'may not be exWhoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy,
by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal
property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, fined
the greater of the fine under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any
property that is damaged or destroyed, or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
119. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 525. The court concluded that "an essential element of
the crime of arson . . . is that the property was 'used in' or 'used in any activity affecting'
interstate or foreign commerce." Id. at 524. The Court concluded that the requirement that the arson be committed on property used in interstate commerce - was jurisdictional.
The prosecution sought to satisfy this element by showing that the house used natural gas
derived, at least in part, from out-of-state sources. Id. But the Court concluded that it must
also examine the constitutionality of the jurisdictional provision:
We recognize that Lopez presented the Commerce Clause issue in a somewhat
different posture, as there the question was whether Congress had exceeded its
commerce powers in adopting a statute, whereas here the question is whether a
jurisdictional element required to ensure the constitutional application of a statute
has been met. This difference might be significant in another case, but it is not in
the case before us.
Id. at 526.
The court also noted that "the question we must decide is whether Congress could
constitutionally prohibit the destruction of the Pappadopoulos residence under the power
vested in it by the Commerce Clause . . . ." Id. at 525.
120. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 526.
121. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
122. Id. (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942)).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss3/8

32

Weaver: Lopez and the Federalization of Criminal Law

1996]

LOPEZAND CRIMINAL LAW FEDERALIZATION

tended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect
and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society,
would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and
123
what is local and create a completely centralized government.'
The court noted that "[1]ike the statute at issue in Lopez and unlike the
case in Wickard, the conduct regulated by section 844(i) - arson - is
not commercial or economic in nature.' 1 24 The court struck down the
arson law:
Lopez demonstrates that the receipt of natural gas at the
Pappadopoulos residence from out-of-state sources is insufficient as a matter of law to confer federal jurisdiction over the section 844(i) count. The

residence was not used at all for commercial activity. It was purely private. If the Commerce Clause were extended to reach the activity that the
government seeks to punish here, we would be "hard-pressed to posit any
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."
Unlike a firearm or a car, both of which can readily move in interstate commerce, a house has a particularly local rather than interstate character. Moreover, a private residence that merely receives natural gas from
out-of-state sources is neither an article nor an instrumentality of commerce. The arson of such a structure has only a remote and indirect effect
on interstate commerce.
[This] is a simple state arson crime. It should have been tried in
state court .. .25

In United States v. Martin,'26 the court upheld the same statute.
Fire destroyed a two-story apartment building. Martin contended that
the conviction could not be sustained because the apartment was neither used in nor affected interstate commerce, as required by Section
844(i). The court noted that the Supreme Court had upheld the statute
as applied to rental properties.'27 But, at the time of the fire, the
building had been unrented for three months and had no utilities. However, although the building's last tenant had ceased paying rent in

123.
Laughlin
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 526 (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (quoting NLRB v. Jones &

Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937))).
Id.
Id. at 527-28.
63 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1995).
Martin, 63 F.3d at 1426-27.
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August, she still had personal property there. Nevertheless, the court
upheld the statute because Martin had only temporarily removed the
property from the rental market.'
A Lopez challenge was also accepted in United States v.
Bailey,'29 in which Bailey was charged criminally for his failure to
pay child support under the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA)."3 '
In striking down the CSRA, the court stated:
[E]ven the dissenters in Lopez agree there are some limitations on
Congress' commerce power, such as family law. Legal and economic arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, a statute which sounds, walks, and
looks like a duck must be a duck statute .... The CSRA, sounds, walks,
and looks like a domestic relations statute and aims the central government
down a slippery slope where it should not be. Though there may be other
bases by which to challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 228, it is
this Court's humble opinion that notions of federalism and comity preclude
the Child Support Recovery Act from passing constitutional scrutiny .... 131

Other lower courts that have considered the CSRA's constitutionality have upheld it.' 32 Illustrative is United States v. Sage:3 3 "Contrary to the Defendant's contentions, Lopez does not mandate a finding
that the CSRA is unconstitutional ....,,3 The court used the ratio36
nal basis test to justify its decision. 35 The court upheld the law

128. Id. at 1428. The court noted:
Although Martin insists that his property had ceased to be a rental unit, the record
tells a different story. Prior to its closing, 1414 Highland was "property with firmly established connections to interstate commerce," and the mere fact that a property is temporarily unrented does not reflect its permanent removal from the rental
market. Most important, Martin himself testified that the vacancy was only temporaty and that he intended to rent the property in the future.
Id.

129. 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
131. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 730 (citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1995); United
States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995); United States v. Hampshire, 892 F.
Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995).
133. 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995).
134. Id. at 89.
135. Id. The Court added:
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finding that child custody payments have a substantial effect on the national economy,137 as reflected in the Act's legislative history,138 and

When reviewing the CSRA, the court's role is narrow: the court must defer
to a congressional determination that the regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce if there is any rational basis for such a finding. A rational
basis exists when the relationship between the activity and interstate commerce is
not so tenuous as to defeat all limitations on congressional power pursuant to its
authority under the Commerce Clause. Once a rational basis exists, the court must
then decide whether the means chosen is reasonably adapted to the end permitted
by the Constitution.
Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 92. The court noted:
The CSRA may be sustained under the line of cases which includes Wickard v.
Filburn, Perez v. United States and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, in which individual instances viewed in the aggregate substantially affect interstate activity. Because it is not necessary to "pile inference upon inference" to perceive an explicit connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce, and in light of the economic nature of the regulated activity, the
legislative history, and the interstate commerce nexus within the language of the
CSRA, the court concludes that the CSRA regulates a Category Three activity and
finds that a rational basis exists for the conclusion that the non-payment of the
"past due support obligations" substantially affects interstate commerce.
Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 92. (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 89-90. The court noted:
Because the payments regulated by the CSRA have a substantial effect on the
national economy, the court determines in this case they are "economic."
Support payments might not be considered traditional items of "commerce,"
but the non-payment of interstate support obligations is economic activity in a way
that mere possession of a handgun in a school zone is not. The non-custodial parent reaps an economic gain each time a support payment is withheld, while the
offspring suffers an economic loss.
The magnitude of the total economic loss and concomitant gain is significant.
Congress considered that of the $48 billion in child support payments owed nationally according to court judgments, a total of $35 billion has never been collected.
Of that amount, interstate cases are responsible for an estimated minimum of $14
billion in uncollected support.
The substantial economic gains and losses at issue in these cases have obvious
implications on interstate commerce. Given the interrelated nature of our national
economy, it is inevitable that local consumption will involve consumption of goods
produced out of state. Thus, the non-payment of the "past due support obligation"
will reduce the child's consumption of goods in interstate commerce. It will also
reduce the custodial parent's consumption of such goods to the extent any alimony
is included in the support obligation. Thus, the very act of withholding payment
causes a depletion of assets that affects interstate commerce.
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that the Act contains a jurisdictional requirement limiting its application
to interstate payments.'39 The court rejected the argument that the
CSRA violates the Tenth Amendment by invading "a province which
traditionally has been reserved to the states - criminal enforcement of
state domestic relations orders,"' 4 ° noting:
Lopez did not turn on whether a regulated activity traditionally has
been the province of the states. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the
court can rationally find that an activity substantially affects interstate
commerce without having to "pile inference upon inference." Because the
connection between interstate support payments and commerce is not attenuated and a rational basis exists for finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce, whether an activity is traditionally regulated by the states
is not a relevant inquiry .... "'

Thus, the court concluded that "the CSRA is not an impermissible
violation of the Tenth Amendment, but rather a rational response by

A shift in interstate market demand occasioned by non-payment would cause
businesses to ship their goods to different states to accommodate this shift. Although in individual instances any perceptible shift might be small, each instance
of non-payment aggregated with non-payments in other interstate support cases
would inevitably force substantial shifts in the interstate flow of goods, because the
total amount of interstate support owed is estimated to be billions of dollars.
Id. (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 91. The court noted:
Although legislative history is not necessarily a requirement for the court's
finding that a rational basis for substantial effect exists in this case, the statistics
and legislative judgment provided in the CSRA's legislative history provide support
for this court's conclusion that Congress acted to control a national problem with
substantial effects on interstate commerce.
Id.(citations omitted).
139. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 91-92. The court noted:
By limiting regulation to interstate payments only, a nexus to interstate commerce
is assured. Interstate market demand for goods in commerce would be redirected
from the state of the non-custodial parent to the state of the child if non-custodial
parents are compelled to make these payments. Every case brought under the
CSRA will result in a change in the financial interests of residents of different
states, assuring a "concrete tie to interstate commerce."
Id.at 91 (citations omitted).
140. Id.at 92.
141. Id. (citation omitted).
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Congress to a national problem that the federal government alone is
equipped to handle." 4
IV.

CONCLUSION

Whether Lopez will lead to an outright reversal of the Court's
Commerce Clause precedent, and with it an end to the federalization of
the criminal law, is far from clear. In any event, it seems unlikely that
the Court will reverse that precedent in the short term. Only one justice (Justice Thomas) argued for a sweeping review of the Court's
Commerce Clause precedent. Four justices dissented (Souter, Stevens,
Ginsberg & Breyer), and two of the concurring justices (Kennedy &
O'Connor) counseled restraint. As a result, absent a change in position
or a shift in the Court's composition, a reversal seems unlikely.
In the short term, practical considerations virtually preclude the
Court from radically altering its position on the Commerce Clause.
Since the 1930s, Congress has used its commerce power to pass hundreds of commercial and criminal statutes. If the Court began overturning those statutes in quantity, the Court would cause an earthquake in
the business and legal communities. Even Justice Thomas recognized
this fact in his concurrence:
Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I
recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a
fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare
decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the
slate clean.'43

As a result, it is not surprising that the lower federal courts have restrictively construed Lopez, and have not used that decision to strike
down other federal statutes.
Nevertheless, Lopez does signal the end of an era. For the first
time in more than half a century, the Court struck down a federal
criminal statute enacted under Congress' Commerce Clause authority.

142. Id. at 93.
143. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1650 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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In so doing, the Court ended an era of almost complete deference to
legislative decisions as manifested by the rational basis test. In order to
pass muster now, a statute must have a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce. And Congress, in light of Lopez, will be more forced to
include jurisdictional statements and findings designed to demonstrate
that effect. Otherwise, the Court may strike down other statutes.
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